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Abstract
We introduce DREAM, a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that finds op-
timal strategies in imperfect-information games with multiple agents. Formally,
DREAM converges to a Nash Equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and to an
extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium in all other games. Our primary inno-
vation is an effective algorithm that, in contrast to other regret-based deep learning
algorithms, does not require access to a perfect simulator of the game to achieve
good performance. We show that DREAM empirically achieves state-of-the-art
performance among model-free algorithms in popular benchmark games, and is
even competitive with algorithms that do use a perfect simulator.
1 Introduction
We consider the challenge of computing a Nash equilibrium in imperfect-information two-player
zero-sum games. This means finding a policy such that both agents play optimally against the other
and no agent can improve by deviating to a different policy.
There has been an explosion of deep reinforcement learning algorithms that compute optimal policies
in single-agent settings and perfect-information games [22, 33, 36, 27]. However, these algorithms
generally fail to compute an optimal policy in imperfect-information games.
More recently, deep reinforcement learning algorithms have been developed that either theoretically or
empirically converge to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games [13,
30, 4, 31, 20, 24, 25]. Among these, neural forms of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) [38,
18, 32, 6] have achieved the best performance [4, 31, 20]. This mirrors the success of tabular CFR,
variants of which are state-of-the-art among tabular equilibrium-finding algorithms [6] and which
have been used in every major AI milestone in the domain of poker [2, 23, 5, 7].
However, in order to deploy tabular CFR in domains with very large state spaces, domain-specific
abstraction techniques that bucket similar states together are needed [11, 3]. While these abstraction
techniques have been successful in poker, they require extensive domain knowledge to construct and
are not applicable to all games. This has motivated the development of CFR algorithms that use
neural network function approximation to generalize with far less domain knowledge.
However, the existing forms of neural CFR only perform well with an exact simulator of the game,
which allows them to sample and explore multiple actions at a decision point and thereby reduce
variance. We show they perform poorly if only a single action is sampled, which is necessary in a
model-free setting.
In this paper we introduce DREAM, a neural form of CFR that samples only a single action at each
decision point. In order to keep variance low despite sampling only a single action, DREAM uses a
sample-based neural form of learned baselines, a fundamental technique that has previously been
shown to be successful in tabular CFR [26, 9].
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DREAM minimizes regret and converges to an -Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games
with  proportional to the neural modeling error, and more generally converges to an - extensive-form
coarse correlated equilibrium (EFCCE) in all games.
We demonstrate empirically that DREAM achieves state-of-the-art performance among model-free
self-play deep reinforcement learning algorithms in two popular benchmark poker variants: Leduc
Hold’em and Flop Texas Hold’em.
2 Notation and Background
Our notation is based on that of partially observable stochastic games [12]. We consider a game with
N = {1, 2, ..., N} agents. We use i to denote the agent index and use −i to refer to all agents except
agent i.
A world state w ∈ W is the exact state of the world. A = A1 ×A2 × ...×AN is the space of joint
actions. Ai(w) denotes the legal actions for agent i at w and a = (a1, a2, ..., aN ) ∈ A denotes a
joint action. After each agent chooses a legal action, a transition function T determines the next
world state w′ drawn from the probability distribution T (w, a) ∈ ∆W . In each world state w, agent i
receives a rewardRi(w). Upon transition from world state w to w′ via joint action a, agent i receives
an observation Oi from a function Oi(w, a,w′).
A history (also called a trajectory) is a finite sequence of legal actions and world states, denoted
h = (w0, a0, w1, a1, ..., wt). The reward i obtained in the last world state of a history h is Ri(h)
and i’s legal actions are Ai(h). An infostate (also called an action-observation history (AOH)) for
agent i is a sequence of an agent’s observations and actions si = (O0i , a
0
i , O
1
i , a
1
i , ..., O
t
i). The set of
all infostates for agent i is Ii. The unique infostate containing history h for agent i is denoted si(h).
The set of histories that correspond to an infostate si is denotedH(si). Note that all histories in an
infostate are, by definition, indistinguishable to agent i, allowing us to define A(si) = A(h) and
R(si) = R(h) for all h ∈ si. An observation Oti may and typically does include rewards achieved
upon the state transitions as well as the opponents’ actions chosen in joint actions leading to the
observation. We denote h′ @ h to indicate h’ is a history reached on the path to h.
An agent’s policy pii is a function mapping from an infostate to a probability distribution
over actions. A policy profile pi is a tuple (pi1, pi2, ..., piN ). The policy of all agents other
than i is denoted pi−i. A policy for a history h is denoted pii(h) = pii(si(h)) and pi(h) =
(pi1(s1(h)), pi2(s2(h)), ..., piN (sN (h))). We also define the transition function T (h, ai, pi−i) as a
function drawing actions for −i from pi−i to form a = ai ∪ a−i and to then return the history h′ from
T (wlast, a), where wlast is the last world state in h.
The expected sum of future rewards (also called the expected value (EV)) for agent i in history
h when all agents play policy profile pi is denoted vpii (h). The EV for an infostate si is denoted
vpii (si) and the EV for the entire game is denoted vi(pi). The EV for an action in a history and
infostate is denoted vpii (h, ai) and v
pi
i (si, ai), respectively. A Nash equilibrium is a policy profile
such that no agent can achieve a higher EV by switching to a different policy. Formally, pi∗ is a Nash
equilibrium if for every agent i, vi(pi∗) = maxpii vi(pii, pi
∗
−i). The exploitability of a policy profile
pi is e(pi) =
∑
i∈N maxpi′i vi(pi
′
i, pi−i).
The reach xpi(h) of a history h is the product of all action probabilities under pi and all transi-
tion function probabilities leading to h. Formally, for ht = (w0, a0, w1, a1, ..., wt), xpi(ht) =
Πhn@ht,i∈Npii(hn, ani )τ(w
n, ani , w
n+1). The agent reach xpii (ht) of a history ht is the product
of the probabilities for all agent i actions leading to ht. Formally, xpii (h
t) = Πhn@ht(hn, ani ).
We similarly define the agent reach xpii (si) of infostate si = (O
0
i , a
0
i , O
1
i , a
1
i , ..., O
t
i) as x
pi
i (si) =
Πt(a
t
i). The external reach xpi−i(si) of infostate si is the probability that agent i would reach
si if they had always taken actions leading to si with 100% probability. Formally, xpi−i(si) =∑
ht∈H(si) Πhn@ht,i∈N\{i}pii(h
n, ani ). If x
pi
i (si) > 0 then external reach is also
∑
h∈H(si)
xpi(h)
xpii (si)
.
3 Related Work
Tabular CFR methods are limited by the need to visit a given state to update the policy played in
it [38, 6, 32, 18]. In large games that are infeasible to fully traverse, domain-specific abstraction
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schemes [11, 3] can shrink the game to a manageable size by clustering states into buckets. This
abstracted version of the game is solved during training and then mapped back onto the full game.
These techniques work in many games [21], but they most often require expert knowledge to design
well and are not applicable to all games.
To address these issues, researchers started to apply neural network function approximation to CFR.
The first such experiment was DeepStack [23]. While DeepStack used neural networks to predict a
quantity called counterfactual value, it still relied on tabular solving for multiple stages of its training
and evaluation process. The benefit of a parameterized policy is that it can make an educated guess for
how to play in states it has never seen during training. Parameterized policies have led to performance
breakthroughs in AI for perfect information games like Atari and Go [14, 28].
Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) [13] approximates extensive-form fictitious play using deep
reinforcement learning from single trajectories. NFSP was the first algorithm to learn a Nash
Equilibrium in two-player imperfect information games from self-play. Since then, various policy
gradient and actor critic methods have been shown to have similar convergence properties if tuned
appropriately [30, 19].
Deep CFR is a fully parameterized variant of CFR that requires no tabular sampling [4]. Deep
CFR substantially outperformed NFSP (which in turn outperforms or closely matches competing
algorithms [30]). Single Deep CFR (SD-CFR) [31] removed the need for an average network in Deep
CFR and thereby enabled better convergence and more time- and space-efficient training. However,
both Deep CFR and Single Deep CFR rely on a perfect simulator of the game to explore multiple
actions at each decision point.
Double Neural CFR is another algorithm aiming to approximate CFR using deep neural networks [20].
Advantage Regret Minimization (ARM) [15] is a regret-based policy gradient algorithm designed for
single agent environments. Before neural networks were considered, Regression CFR (R-CFR) [37]
used regression trees to estimate regrets in CFR and CFR+. However, R-CFR seems to be incompati-
ble with sparse sampling techniques [30], rendering it less scalable.
4 Review of Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)
4.1 Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) [38] is an iterative policy improvement algorithm that
computes a new policy profile pit on each iteration t. The average of these policies converges to a
Nash equilibrium.
CFR can apply either simultaneous or alternating updates. If the former is chosen, CFR produces
piti for all agents i on every iteration t. With alternating updates, CFR produces a policy only for one
agent i on each iteration, with i = t mod 2 on iteration t. We describe the algorithm in this section in
terms of simultaneous updates.
The instantaneous regret for action ai at infostate si is rti(si, ai) = xpi
t
−i(si)
(
vpi
t
i (si, ai)− vpi
t
i (si)
)
.
rti(si, ai) is a measure of how much more agent i could have gained on average by always choosing
ai in si, weighed by the external reach. The average regret on iteration T is defined as RTi (si, ai) =∑T
t=1 r
t
i(si,ai)
T . CFR defines the policy for agent i on iteration t+ 1 based on their overall regret as
pit+1i (si, ai) =

max{0,Rti(si,ai)}∑
a′
i
∈Ai(si) max{0,R
t
i(si,a
′
i)} if
∑
a′i∈Ai(si) max{0, R
t
i(si, a
′
i)} > 0
1
|Ai(si)| otherwise
(1)
The initial policy is set to uniform random. The average policy p¯iTi is
p¯iTi (si, ai) =
∑T
t=1 x
pit
i (si)pi
t
i(si, ai)∑T
t=1 x
pit
i (si)
(2)
On each iteration t, CFR traverses the entire game tree and updates the regrets for every infostate in
the game according to policy profile pit. These regrets define a new policy pit+1. The average policy
over all iterations converges to a Nash equilibrium.
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4.2 Linear CFR
Linear CFR [6] is a variant of CFR that weighs the updates to the regret and average policy on
iteration t by t. Thus, under Linear CFR, RTi (si, ai) =
∑T
t=1(tr
t
i(si, ai)) and p¯i
T
i (si, ai) =∑T
t=1(tx
pit
i (si)pi
t
i(si,ai))∑T
t=1(tx
pit
i (si))
. This modification accelerates CFR by two orders of magnitude.
4.3 Monte Carlo CFR (MC-CFR)
Monte Carlo CFR (MC-CFR) is a framework that allows CFR to only update regrets on part of
the tree for a single agent, called the traverser. Two variants relevant to our work are External
Sampling (ES) and Outcome Sampling (OS) [18]. In OS, regrets are updated for the traverser only
along a single trajectory (i.e., a single action is sampled for each agent at each decision point, and a
single outcome is sampled from T ). In ES, a single action is sampled for each non-traverser agent
and a single outcome is sampled from T , but every traverser action is explored. When agent i is the
traverser in ES or OS, all other agents sample actions according to pi−i. In OS, we use a sampling
policy ξti(si) profile rather than pi
t to choose actions during play. ξti(si) is defined separately for the
traverser i and any other agent j
ξti(si, ai) = 
1
|Ai(si)| + (1− )pi
t
i(si, ai) ξ
t
j(sj , aj) = pi
t
j(sj , aj) (3)
For a thorough and more general description of MC-CFR see [18].
4.4 Variance-Reduced Outcome Sampling with Baselines (VR-MC-CFR)
ES typically produces lower-variance estimates of expected values than OS. Variance-reduced MC-
CFR (VR-MCCFR) is a method to reduce variance in MC-CFR and is particularly helpful for
OS [26, 9]. Given that OS ultimately reaches a terminal history z, the baseline-adjusted sampled
expected value in history h is
v˜pi
t
i (si(h), ai|z) = v˜pi
t
i (h, ai|z) =
{
bi(h, ai) +
∑
h′{p(h′|T (h,ai,pit−i))v˜pi
t
i (h
′|z)}−bi(h,ai)
ξti(si,ai)
if (h, ai) v z
bi(h, ai) otherwise
(4)
v˜pi
t
i (si(h)|z) = v˜pi
t
i (h|z) =
{
Ri(h) if h = z∑
ai∈Ai(h) pi
t
i(h, ai)v˜
pit
i (h, ai) otherwise
(5)
where b is called the history-action baseline, a user-defined scalar function that ideally is closely
correlated with v. Common choices in the tabular setting are a running average across visits to any
given history, and domain-specific estimates of v [26, 9].
4.5 Deep CFR and Single Deep CFR (SD-CFR)
Deep CFR [4] approximates the behavior of tabular CFR from partial game tree traversals. For each
CFR iteration t, Deep CFR runs a constant T external sampling traversals to collect samples of
instantaneous regret and adds the data to a reservoir buffer Bdi [35], where agent i is the traverser.
Deep CFR then trains a value network Dˆti to predict the average regret (divided by external reach)
for unseen infostate actions. Dˆti is then used to approximate the policy pi
t+1
i for agent i like tabular
CFR would produce given Rti . More data is collected by sampling based on this policy, and the
process repeats until convergence.
Specifically, on each iteration T , the algorithm fits a value network DˆTi for one agent i to ap-
proximate advantages defined as DTi (si, ai) =
RTi (si,ai)∑T
t=1(x
pit
−i(si))
. Deep CFR divides RTi (si, ai) by∑T
t=1(x
pit
−i(si)) to erase the difference in magnitude arising from highly varying realisation proba-
bilities across infostates, which makes the data easier for the value network to approximate. This
division does not change the policy output by Equation 1 since every action in an infostate is divided
by the same value.
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In cases where Deep CFR predicts non-positive advantage for all infostate actions, it chooses the
action with the highest advantage rather than a uniform random policy as vanilla CFR would do.
Since it is the average policy that converges to a Nash equilibrium in CFR, not the final strategy, Deep
CFR trains a second neural network Sˆ to approximate the average policy played over all iterations.
Data for Sˆi is stored in a separate reservoir buffer Bsi and collected during the same traversals that
data for Bvi is being collected on.
Single Deep CFR (SD-CFR) is a modification of Deep CFR that instead stores all value networks
from each CFR iteration to disk and mimics the average policy exactly during play by sampling
one of them and using its policy for the entire game. This is mathematically equivalent to sampling
actions from the average policy. SD-CFR eliminates the approximation error in Deep CFR resulting
from training a network to predict the average policy, at the minor cost of using extra disk space to
store the models from each CFR iteration (or a random sample of CFR iterations).
5 Description of DREAM
In this section, we will describe DREAM, (D)eep (RE)gret minimization with (A)dvantage Baselines
and (M)odel-free learning. The primary contribution of this paper is to effectively combine a deep
neural network approximation of outcome sampling CFR with learned baselines.
Like Single Deep CFR, DREAM is trained using alternating CFR iterations. On each iteration t at each
encountered infostate si, we obtain estimated advantages Dˆti(si, ai|θti) for the actions ai ∈ Ai(si)
by inputting si into the advantage network parameterized by θti . From these estimated advantages,
we obtain a policy piti(si) via regret matching as shown in Equation 1, except using Dˆ
t
i in place of
Rti , and picking the action with the highest Dˆ
t
i probability 1 when all advantages are negative.
5.1 Incorporating outcome sampling with exploration
On each iteration t, DREAM collects advantages from T trajectories of the game for agent i, where
i = t mod N following the outcome sampling (OS) MC-CFR scheme [18] with the sampling
policy profile introduced in 4.4. where  > 0 is the exploration parameter. To compensate for the
shifted sampling distribution due to , we weigh data samples stored in Bdi by
1
xξ
t
i (si)
during neural
training. Storing advantage models from each iteration and sampling one randomly to determine a
policy used during play, as is done in SD-CFR, results in an algorithm we call Outcome Sampling
SD-CFR (OS-SD-CFR). We show in section 7 that OS-SD-CFR performs poorly.
5.2 Variance reduction using a learned Q-baseline
We hypothesised that the higher variance of advantage estimates in OS traversals is to blame for
OS-SD-CFR’s bad performance. DREAM aims to reduce this source of variance by implementing a
neural form of history baselines [9], the tabular form of which is described in section 4.4.
DREAM uses a baseline network Qˆti(s
∗(h), ai|φti) parameterized by φti as a baseline, where s∗ is the
set of infostates for all players at h, s∗(h) = (s0(h), ..., sN (h)).3 Qˆti is fine-tuned from Qˆ
t−1
i when
t > 0 and initialized with random weights on t = 0. It is trained using expected SARSA [34] on a
circular buffer Bqi . Formally, it updates φ
t
i to minimize its mean squared error (MSE) to the target
value sampleRi(h) +
∑
a′i∈Ai pi
t(si(h
′), a′i)Qˆ
t
i(s
∗(h′), a′i), where h
′ is drawn from T (h, ai, pit−i).
VR-MCCFR computes history-action baselines both for player actions and ‘chance actions’ from
the environment. The latter requires access to a perfect simulator of the environment’s transition
function. Thus, DREAM only uses baselines for the player actions. Given that OS ultimately reaches
a terminal history z, the baseline-adjusted sampled expected value at history h where action a′i is
3We do not define Qˆ to take h directly as input since h is not available in a model-free setting. However, in
the games we investigate, h and s∗(h) are equivalent.
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played leading to h′, is
v˜pi
t
i,DREAM (h, ai|z) =
{
Qˆti(s
∗(h), ai)− v˜
pit
i,DREAM (h
′|z)−Qˆti(s∗(h),ai)
ξt(si,ai)
if ai = a′i
Qˆti(s
∗(h), ai) otherwise
(6)
v˜pi
t
i,DREAM (h|z) =
{
Ri(h) if h = z∑
ai∈Ai(h) pi
t
i(h, ai)v˜
pit
i,DREAM (h, ai|z) otherwise
(7)
and v˜pi
t
i,DREAM (si(h), ai|z) = v˜pi
t
i,DREAM (h, ai|z) and v˜pi
t
i,DREAM (si(h)|z) = v˜pi
t
i,DREAM (h|z).
We define the sampled immediate advantage as
d˜ti,DREAM (si, ai) = v˜
pit
i,DREAM (si, ai)− v˜pi
t
i,DREAM (si) (8)
Note that the expectation of d˜ti,DREAM (si, ai) is
rti(si,ai)
xpi
t
−i(si,ai)
. Because we defined the sampling policy
for −i as ξt−i(si, ai) = pit−i(si, ai), the expectation of samples added to the advantage buffer Bdi on
iteration t in history h will be proportional to rti(si(h), ai). Furthermore, because from agent i’s
perspective histories are sampled based on their information, the expectation for data added to Bdi in
infostate si is proportional to rti(si, ai). Thus, training Dˆ
t
i on B
d
i means it approximates a quantity
proportional to the average regret as defined in section 4.1. To implement Linear CFR [6] in DREAM,
we weigh the neural training loss of d˜ti in B
d
i by t.
5.3 The average policy
In order to play according to the average policy, we follow the approach used in SD-CFR [31],
described in Section 4.5, in which the advantage model from each iteration, or a random subset
thereof, is stored on disk in a set BMi and one is sampled randomly at test time. That model is then
used to determine the policy for the whole game. When implementing linear CFR, the probability of
sampling model t is proportional to t. When needed, the explicit average policy probabilities can be
computed in O(|BMi |) time by evaluating and averaging strategies derived from all networks in BMi .
Deep CFR’s method of computing the average policy by training a separate neural network on action
probability vectors collected during training [4] is also compatible, but to correct for sampling bias,
the neural training loss of samples from iteration t is weighted by 1
xξ−i
(h).
5.4 Convergence
The convergence of MC-CFR [17] using function approximation to estimate infoset advantages has
been previously studied in [4]. They show that minimizing mean-squared error of predicted advan-
tages on historical samples (as we do in DREAM) is equivalent to tabular MC-CFR. Furthermore, if
a model only approximately minimizes the MSE, its convergence bound incurs an additional constant
average regret term proportional to the maximum gap L between the model’s MSE error on the
samples and the error of the exact minimizer ([4], Theorem 1).
MC-CFR convergence results hold for any unbiased estimator of state-action values, and thus permit
the use of arbitrary state-action baselines, although the rate of convergence is related to the variance
of the baseline-adjusted estimator (i.e. the quality of the baseline). More details can be found in [26].
We derive a bound on the cumulative regret for DREAM in Appendix D.
6 Experimental Setup
We explore a sweep of hyperparameters for DREAM, and compare its exploitability over the number
of game states observed to Deep CFR [4], Single Deep CFR (SD-CFR) [31], and Neural Fictitious
Self-Play (NFSP) [13]. We chose Leduc Poker [29] and Flop hold’em poker [4], two popular poker
games, as benchmark domains. A description of these can be found in the appendix. We use Linear
CFR [6] for DREAM and all variants of SD-CFR we evaluate. For all experiments, we plot the mean
and standard deviation across three independent runs.
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In FHP we measure an approximate lower bound on exploitability computed by training a DDQN
agent [36, 33] against DREAM and running a number of hands between DREAM and the final
iteration of DDQN and for evaluation. Details are in appendix C.
6.1 Neural Networks
Our work does not focus on exploring new neural architectures. Instead, to enable easy reproducibility,
we use the neural architecture demonstrated to be successful with Deep CFR and NFSP [4] for all
networks in all algorithms and games. Details and notes on the required minimal modifications to
input and output layers that were required for algorithmic reasons can be found in appendix E.
On each iteration, Qˆti is trained for 1000 minibatches of 512 samples using the Adam optimizer [16]
with a learning rate of 0.001 and gradient norm clipping of 1 in both games. Bqi has a capacity of
200,000. For comparibility, DREAM’s value networks use the same training parameters as those
SD-CFR [4, 31], unless otherwise stated. Both SD-CFR and DREAM use advantage buffers Bdi with
capacities of 40 million samples in FHP and 2 million in Leduc. Value networks for 3,000 batches of
size 2,048 and 10,000 batches of size in Leduc and FHP, respectively. For DREAM with Deep CFR’s
average network we allow an additional buffer Bsi of 2 million samples per player. The average
network is trained for 4,000 batches of 2,048 samples.
The number of traversals sampled per iteration for SD-CFR and DREAM was chosen such that both
algorithms visit roughly the same number of states per iteration. In Leduc, we chose a successful
value for DREAM (900) and then divide by 2.6 (the empirical average ratio between states visited by
ES and OS in Leduc) to get 346 for SD-CFR. We compare this to the initially proposed setting of
1,500, which performs worse [31]. In FHP, we use 10,000 for SD-CFR as proposed by [4] and 50,000
for DREAM. Again, the factor of 5 difference cancels out the ratio of states seen by OS compared to
ES, determined empirically in preliminary runs. However, in FHP we stared from the parameters for
SD-CFR and adjusted DREAM accordingly.
Apart from the neural network architecture, NFSP uses the same hyperparamters in Leduc as
presented the original paper [13]. Because the authors did not use FHP as a benchmark, we use the
hyperparameters they applied in Limit hold’em poker, a similar game.
7 Experimental Results
We first investigate settings and hyperparameters of DREAM (see figure 1) and then compare DREAM
to other algorithms (see figure 2). We find that DREAM significantly outperforms other model-free
algorithms in Leduc and FHP. DREAM’s performance matches that of SD-CFR in Leduc, despite not
requiring a perfect simulator of the game.
We found that few minibatch updates per iteration are needed for Qˆ in DREAM. Thus, the overhead
relative to OS-SD-CFR that the baseline network adds is not significant. This may be because training
targets for Qˆ change only slightly on each iteration and Qˆt is started from Qˆt−1’s weights. Moreover,
small modelling errors may be insignificant compared to the remaining game variance.
Deep CFR [4] performs better when value networks Dˆt are trained from scratch on each iteration t.
We investigate three settings: 1) Always reset: train from scratch for 3,000 minibatches on every
iteration, 2) Never reset: train from scratch for 3,000 minibatches on t = 0 but train 500 minibatches
starting from Dˆt−1i if t > 0, 3) Reset every 10 iterations: train from scratch for 3,000 minibatches
if t mod 10 = 0 else finetune for just 500 minibatches starting from Dˆt−1i .
8 Conclusions
We have introduced DREAM, a model-free self-play deep reinforcement learning algorithm. DREAM
converges to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games, and more
broadly to an extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium in all other games. In practise, DREAM
achieves state-of-the-art performance among model-free RL algorithms in imperfect information
games, beating the existing baseline NFSP [13] by two orders of magnitude with respect to sample
complexity in Leduc Hold’em and reaching a far lower exploitability than NFSP after multiple days
of training in Flop Hold’em Poker.
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Figure 1: Ablation studies in Leduc. Top-left: Comparing  for DREAM. Top-right: Various numbers of
trajectories sampled per DREAM iteration. Bottom-left: Various numbers of minibatch updates of DREAM’s
Qˆ per iteration. Bottom-right: Modes of resetting the parameters of Dˆ in DREAM.
Figure 2: Exploitability comparison of DREAM with other algorithms in Leduc poker (top) and Flop Hold’em
Poker (bottom). DREAM performs competitively with non-model-free Neural CFR methods (left), and outper-
forms all other model-free neural methods (right). The number of traversals for SD-CFR variants were chosen
such that the number of nodes traversed per iteration is approximately equal to that of DREAM.
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9 Broader Impact
DREAM seeks to find equilibria in imperfect-information games without relying on an explicit model
of the interaction. In contrast to most other works in deep reinforcement learning, our algorithms
are aiming to find equilibrium policies. This is particularly relevant for iterative decision-making
processes - both competitive [6] and cooperative [1].
Beneficial future applications of DREAM after further research and development could include
political and market management decision support, negotiation and agreement in self-driving car
fleets, and other decision making processes. Equilibrium computation is an essential part of robust
multi-agent decision making.
Potential adverse applications most prominently include providing easy access to tools that aid
cheating in online imperfect-information games with our open-sourced implementation of DREAM.
For poker, the most prominent imperfect-information game and the one where cheating would have
the most significant consequences, successful domain-specific algorithms already exist [7], so this
publication should not add significant additional risk in that domain.
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A Rules of Flop Hold’em Poker
Flop Hold’em Poker (FHP) is a two-player zero-sum game. The positions of the two players alternate
after each hand. When acting, players can choose to either fold, call, or raise. When a player folds,
the money in the pot is awarded to the other player. When a player calls, the player places money in
the pot to equal to the opponent’s contribution. Raising means adding more chips to the pot than the
opponent’s contribution.
A round ends when a player calls (and both players have acted). There can be at most three raises
in each betting round. Raises are always in increments of $100. At the start of a hand, players are
dealt two private cards from a standard 52-card deck. P1 must contribute $50 to the pot and P2 must
contribute $100. A betting round then occurs starting with P1. After the round ends, three community
cards are revealed face up. Another round of betting starts, but P2 acts first this time. At the end of
this betting round, if no player has folded, the player with the strongest five-card poker hand wins,
where the player’s two private cards and the three community cards are taken as their five-card hand.
In the case of a tie, the pot is split evenly between both players.
B Rules of Leduc Poker
Leduc Poker differs from Flop Hold’em poker in that the deck only six cards, made from two suits
{a, b} and three ranks {J,Q,K}. Like FHP, the game consists of two rounds. At the start of the
game, each player contributes $50, called the ante, to the pot and is handed one private card. There
can be at most two raises per round, where the bet-size is fixed at $100 in the first round, and $200 in
the second. When the game transitions from the first to the second betting round, one public card is
revealed. If no player folded, the strongest hand wins. If thee rank of a player’s private card matches
that of the public card, they win. If not, K > Q > J determines the strongest hand. If both players’
private cards have the same rank, the pot is split between them.
C Approximate lower bound on the Best Response using RL
When agent i’s policy is frozen, computing a best response policy for −i can be seen as a partially
observable single-agent problem. We leverage this by running a deep RL algorithm to make best
response computations feasible in bigger games. While almost any deep RL algorithm could be used,
we chose DDQN [33, 36]. We train DDQN for 50,000 iterations with a batch size of 2048 and 512
steps per iteration. The circular buffer can hold 400,000 infostates. The target network is updated
every 300 iterations. DDQN’s exploration parameter decays exponentially from 0.3 to 0.02.
After training, we run 1 million hands between the agent and the learned approximate BR to obtain a
lower bound on the actual BR with minimal uncertainty (95% confidence interval of 5mBB/G in
our experiments). This computation is run on 6 CPUs and takes 12 hours per datapoint.
Figure 3 shows the winnings during training, average across both agents. This sample was taken
on DREAM iteration 180 (out of around 500) and is representative of the general trend. Note that
this includes exploration and is thus not representative of the approximate BR computed in the end,
where no exploration is done.
Figure 3: Convergence of DDQN as the approximate best response against DREAM on iteration 180
in Flop Hold’em Poker.
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We also found by running multiple instances of DDQN that the variance in this evaluation is fairly
low, with all DDQN replicas arriving at similar exploitabilities.
D Proofs of Theorems
D.1 Mapping notation principles
Our notation is more closely related to that of the reinforcement learning community than the
conventional notation in the CFR literature. Most importnatly, what’s usually referred to as A in
CFR [18] is Ai in our notation. The transition function T used in our work is usually referred to as
chance in the conventional notation. Moreover, the conventional notation assumes only one player
acts in each node. We generalise this by considering opponent actions part of the transition function
from the perspective of agent i.
D.2 Bound on DREAM’s regret
Theorem 1. Suppose a series of policies pit are chosen via a CFR learning rule with outcome
sampling, using the -regret-matching sampling policy ξti for the traversing agent described in 3. Let
di be the maximum number of sequential decision points for agent i (i.e. the game depth for i). For
any p ∈ [0, 1), the average regret RTi for agent i over this series of policies is bounded by
= RTi ≤
∆√
T
(
|Ii|
√
|Ai|+ 2
( |Ai|

)di√
2 log
1
p
)
(9)
with probability 1− p.
Proof. Let RTi and R˜
T
i be the average regret under MC-CFR and CFR, respectively.
We start from the original CFR bound in [38], Theorem 4: If agent i selects actions according to CFR
then R˜Ti ≤ ∆|Ii|
√
|Ai|√
T
.
Next, we apply the bound from [10], Proposition 1: If agent i selects actions according to MC-CFR
then
P
[
RT (u) ≤ R˜T (u) + (M + M˜)
√
2
T
log
1
p
]
≥ 1− p (10)
where M and M˜ are bounds on the difference between the minimum and maximum loss in the full
and sampled game, respectively. Trivially, M ≤ ∆. According to [10] Lemma 2, if agent i plays
some sampling policy ξti and the opponent agents their true policy pi
t
i , then M˜ ≤ maxz∈Z ∆ξti [z] ,
where ξti [z] is the probability that ξ
t
i plays to terminal node z assuming the opponent and chance do.
DREAM uses an -regret matching sampling scheme for agent i; therefore, we can easily bound
ξti [z] ≤
(

|Ai|
)di
, where dmaxi is the maximum number of sequential decision points for agent i on
any path of the game.
Putting this all together, we find that for any p ∈ [0, 1),
RTi ≤ ∆|Ii|
√|Ai|√
T
+
(
∆ + ∆
( |Ai|

)di)√ 2
T
log
1
p
(11)
with probability 1− p.
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Importantly, this theorem does not imply that the actions chosen by the MC-CFR learning procedure
are themselves no-regret; indeed, since DREAM uses an off-policy sampling scheme its regret during
"training" may be arbitrarily high. The theorem instead implies that the historical average of the CFR
policies pit, which is the policy returned by the DREAM algorithm, converges to a Nash equilibrium
at this rate in two-player zero-sum games. In n-player general-sum games, it also converges to an
extensive-form coarse correlated equilibrium at this rate [8].
E Neural Network Architecture
We use the neural architecture demonstrated to be successful with Deep CFR and NFSP [4] (see
figure 4). Slight differences between the networks are that we apply a softmax function to the last
layer of NFSP’s and Deep CFR’s average networks like the original papers do. Moreover, DREAM’s
Q network requires the input of both player’s private cards and thus has a slightly adjusted input layer.
Figure 4: Neural network architecture as in [4]. We set D=64 in all experiments.
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